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Introduction
As a social construct, terrorism takes place within specific historical and social
contexts (Schmid, 1992). Terrorism is a politically motivated form of premeditated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets. As a complex phenomenon,
numerous attempts have been made to differentiate terrorism based upon the kinds of
goals pursued, the types of acts manifested, the motivations for these acts, the levels of
organizational hierarchy encountered and the social and psychological profiles of
participants (Bates, 2011, 2012).
Terrorism is associated with a structural environment characterized by an imbalance
of power between different ideological groups (Black, 2004). In the tradition of the 19 th
century Russian anarchist group, the People’s Will, it is propaganda by deed (White,
2014). Also, it is a tactic that morphs as terrorist groups evolve and change (Lesser,
1999). As a strategy and tactic, terrorism may include bombing, hijacking, arson,
kidnapping, or hostage taking – all of which can be enhanced by force multipliers like
transnational support, technology, media coverage and ideological and/or religious
extremism (Jenkins, 1983). These force multipliers have contributed to the rise of
terrorism as a major threat in the last half of the 20th and early 21st centuries.
Modern terrorism has taken many forms. It has been an important strategy in the
wars of independence by many former colonies and emerging nations. The Chinese
and Cuban revolutions, Vietnam War, and the many conflicts in South America, the
Middle East, and Southwest Asia were marked by numerous acts of terrorism by all
participants. Increasingly, world news is rife with reports of terrorist groups known by an
escalating number of alphabet-challenging letters who use terrorism as a means to
promote their causes, challenge their enemies and intimidate populations.
Terrorists can be differentiated in terms of their objectives and organizational
structure. The U.S. Army (2007) describes terrorist groups as separatist, ethnocentric,
nationalist and revolutionary. They also can be characterized in terms of organization
and structure (Bates, 2011). Today, groups such as al Qaeda, ISIS (DAESH), Hamas,
Hezbollah and other groups employ terrorism as a tactic. They deploy units or
individuals to carry out directed or inspired attacks. As such, however, they are
vulnerable to detection and interdiction. The intelligence and related agencies in the
United States and abroad have increasingly been successful in identifying, tracking, and
in a number of cases eliminating or significantly degrading these groups (Maras, 2013).
The extensive efforts to identify and track today’s terrorists, however, have
contributed to the growth of another form of terrorism which is much more difficult to
identify, track and counter. Self-radicalized, lone wolf terrorists are the response by
groups to promote and recruit individuals and motivate them to action while operating
beyond the awareness and response of the increasingly more effective agents of
counterterrorism (Bates, 2012).
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The Lone Wolf Threat
The rise of lone wolf terrorism has created an increasing dilemma in today’s security
environment. With more effective counterterrorism practices, leaderless resistance has
emerged as one of the most difficult forms of terrorism to anticipate and counter. Most
recently, lone wolf terrorism has been associated with right-wing reactionaries and
religiously radicalized Islamic jihadists (Bates, 2012).
Lone wolf terrorism involves self-radicalized individuals who commit violent acts to
promote a cause or support a belief system. These acts, or propaganda by deeds, are
extremely difficult to counter because they appear to be isolated and avoid many of the
traditional organizational characteristics used to identify and track traditional terrorist
groups. Though usually not capable of large-scale attacks, the modern lone wolf
terrorist has access to a range of weapons with greater capacities for terror-inspiring
events. However, the power of the lone wolf terrorist is not necessarily the actual level
of harm potentially experienced, but the level of intimidation that the threat of such
random acts of violence can exert on a community.
Today’s media has played a major role in providing visibility so that others can be
motivated and follow the lead of previous successful lone wolf attacks (Matusitz, 2015).
Osama bin Laden, in the 2003 jihadist Internet forum “Sada Jihad,” urged his followers
to take action without waiting for instructions (Baker and deGraaf, 2010). Likewise, al
Qaeda leader Abu Jihad al Masri promoted lone wolf terrorism in ‘How to Fight Alone
(Clemons, 2010). Recently, ISIS called upon its followers around the world to pick up a
knife, gun or any weapon and become personal warriors for the cause (Love & Yan,
2014).
The research on lone wolf terrorism has dramatically increased in the past decade.
In February 2010, both the director of the FBI and the director of the CIA stated that
lone wolf terrorism was a major concern of their agencies (Sage, 2011). Typologies
suggest that these terrorists may range from reactionary rightwing individuals,
opponents of abortion, environmental or animal rights advocates, hate group members,
or advocates of radical Islam like al Qaeda and ISIS.
In a single dimensional typology, Phillips and Pohl (2011) identify two-types of lone
wolf terrorists: risk aversion and risk seeking. Looking at types of justification, Lisa
Andrews (2001) identifies lone wolf terrorists in terms of moral justification, religious
conviction, social change orientation, level of political antagonism, commitment to
revenge, desire for attention, and importance of symbolism. In addition, Artiga (2011)
suggests that lone wolves are trying to send a message or promote an ideological
position, raise awareness for a cause, shape the political process, spread fear, defame
a major social institution, or correct a major injustice. Others note that lone wolves may
be motivated by ideological, social, psychological, monetary, threats, or greed.
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Multidimensional typologies of lone wolf terrorists include White’s (2012) Tactical
Typology of Terrorism with its emphasis on the type of activity (criminal/political), the
level of terrorist activity, and the form of response by control agents. Likewise,
Pantucci’s (2011) “A Typology of Lone Wolves: A Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist
Terrorists” focuses on the means and contexts of self-radicalization, tactics of
engagement, and the framework of available support. The loner, the lone wolf, the lone
wolf pack and the lone attacker have been popular categories of Islamist terrorists. In
addition, Bates’ (2012) General Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism is a four dimensional
(Rubik’s Cube) perspective which looks at the influence of the extent of involvement in
the radicalization process (self/group), type of motivation (altruistic/egoistic), form
(chaos/career), and risk management (aversion/taking).
Identifying Lone Wolf Terrorists
These more complex perspectives have allowed scholars and security agencies to
identify possible combinations of types and to better understand the social,
psychological, and structural components that create environments conducive to the
emergence of lone wolf terrorism. With over 60 U. S. cases prosecuted in 2015 and
900 investigations in all 50 states, we can better understand the level of threat as well
as the backgrounds and characteristics of these terrorists (Bergen, 2016).
Identifying terrorists in general, and lone wolf terrorists in particular, is difficult.
Almost fifty years ago Hacker (1976) and others attempted to profile terrorists. They
suggested that terrorists were young, unmarried, middle class males with some
university training and with an understanding or affinity for left-wing political philosophy,
which was considered at the core of the terrorist actions of the day (Russell and Miller,
1983). However, these generalizations did not facilitate any useful strategies of
identification. Attempts at psychological profiling by Stevens (2005) and McCaulley and
Moscalenko (2014) offered some interesting insights but little basis for practical
intelligence. Specifically, Staub (2002) found that terrorists were linked to three types of
social groups: those identifying with a suffering group; those who respond to suffering in
their own group; and alienated individuals who find purpose in joining a terrorist group.
Likewise, McCaulley and Moscalenko stated that terrorists may manifest personality
types represented by revolutionaries drawn to a cause, those who try a variety of
revolutionary or terrorist causes, those who have had a sudden conversion experience,
and those who find acceptance in a committed peer group (White, 2014). On the other
hand, Laqueur (1999), Pape ( 2003) and Borum (2004) suggested that as terrorism
changes over time, the profile changes. Interestingly, Horgun (2009) wrote that as a
complex phenomenon, identifying the roots of terrorism is not as fruitful as identifying
the routes.
With the rise of leaderless resistance and interest in the radicalization process,
identifying lone wolf terrorists has emerged as a prominent concern. Specifically, violent
radicalization, alienation and self-estrangement have been identified as socialpsychological precursors to terrorism (Jenkins, 2009; White, 2014). These processes
focus on interpretations of reality in which individuals perceive that their existence is
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threatened by powerful, evil and depraved forces, thus freeing them from normative
restraints.
Gill, Horgan and Deckart (2014) analyzed the socio-demographic characteristics of
119 convicted lone-actor terrorists in the United States and Europe, focusing on
ideological commitment and network support structures. They categorized lone-actors
in terms of gender, age of first terrorist act, relations status and family characteristics,
education, employment history/status, military experience, ideological justifications,
awareness of intentions, pre-event behaviors, degree of perceived social isolation,
behavior within a wider network, and links to a wider network. The results of their
analysis suggested seven significant findings: (1) no uniform profile; (2) prior to the
events, others knew of their radicalization and intent to act; (3) a significant range of
events or actions preceded their attacks; (4) many but not all were socially isolated; (5)
there was involvement with like-minded others; (6) their actions were not sudden or
impulsive; (7) despite the diversity of lone-actor terrorists, there were distinguishable
differences between subgroups. Their findings indicated the importance of focusing on
behavior rather than only on semi-stable (at best) socio-demographic characteristics.
Hamm and Spaaj (2015) developed one of the most comprehensive databases on
domestic lone wolf terrorists. They suggested that, in terms of lethality, lone wolf
terrorism is not on the rise in the U.S., but the targets are increasingly police and
military personnel and the use of firearms is now the preferred tactic. Though they
found no standard profile, many are unemployed, single white males with criminal
records and are prone to mental illness. Their research supports previous studies that
radicalization is associated with a combination of personal and political grievances
which have formed the basis for an affinity with other online sympathizers. A triggering
event is usually associated with some public statement, blog, post or manifesto.
Unfortunately, much of the data upon which this study was based included domestic,
right wing or special interest causes. It did not include the growing number of jihadistinspired acts.
Historically, the roots of terrorism are most often found in the socio-economic,
political and/or religious fabric of society. Addressing the perceived inequalities
between majority and minority populations is the logical strategy in minimizing or
eliminating the causes of asymmetric conflict in general and the specific instances of
lone wolf terrorism. However, in a multi-cultural world with extensive boundaries
between diverse groups, addressing these roots of conflict is challenging. Because of
these conditions, identifying potential terrorists in general and lone wolf terrorists in
particular is very difficult. Social scientists have, as we have seen, attempted to
develop psychological and social profiles, but they have not been specific enough to
facilitate the tracking and control of these threat agents. Therefore, the routes to
terrorism have been suggested as a more useful strategy. These more complex
perspectives have allowed scholars and security agencies to identify possible
combinations of types and to better understand the social, psychological, and structural

4

components that create environments conducive to the emergence of lone wolf
terrorists and to identify and track them.
Tracking Terrorists
Unlike military units, terrorist groups are hard to track. A terrorist’s affiliation may be
to non-state entities, and often they operate with or without the knowledge of any official
authority. Their anonymity and mobility may mask the origins or specific locations of
their infrastructures or even bases of operation. In such situations, there are limited
political channels that a government can apply to lessen the threat of many terrorist
groups (Strickland, 2014). Also, in some countries governmental authority isn't strong
enough to crack down on terrorist groups, and in others governments may share similar
beliefs and philosophies with these groups. These governments might not put forth
much effort to end terrorist activity. When governments are unable to gather
international support to pressure another government to end hostile activities, there are
few political channels to curtail terrorism.
Extensive efforts have been directed to understand the terrorism process, including
studies of motivation, recruitment, retention, and structurally conducive social,
economic, political and religious environments (Bates, 2011). Strategies and tactics for
identifying and tracking terrorists have been developed by counterterrorism agencies
using psychological profiling, forensic accounting, communication intercepts, social
media monitoring, biometrics and a number of other classified techniques (Lichtblau and
Risen, 2006). Early in the war on terrorism the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
(TFTP), with its links to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT), provided significant information for the identification and
arrest of a number of terrorists operating in the U.S. However, concerns raised by the
release of the Snowden documents over the legality of extensive data mining by the
NSA, FBI, CIA and the U.S. Treasury Department resulted in a number of international
treaties and more restrictive regulations. This reduced access to forensic accounting
information (TFTP, 2014). Likewise, the development of the Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment (TIDE, 2014), with 680,0000 to a million subjects on the government watch
list as well as over 860,000 biometric files, reflects the extensive resources brought to
bear by counterterrorism agencies.
Communication monitoring and intercepts have been successful in limiting the ability
of terrorist groups to plan and coordinate their activities. The National Security Agency
(NSA, 2016) is the primary U.S. agency responsible for cryptology and Signals
Intelligence (SIGNT) and Information Assurance (IA) products and services. Using
sophisticated monitoring technology (classified), the NSA provides world-wide access to
electronic communications. Though restricted by federal law against domestic
monitoring, other federal and state agencies, with restrictions, have been able to
provide valuable intelligence related to terrorist threats within the U.S.
Concerns about personal privacy and the legality of domestic communication
monitoring have given rise to the growth of commercial encryption software, which has
helped terrorists avoid detection. Though counterterrorism agencies have invested in
5

enormous programs to automatically collect and analyze electronic communications, the
growing sophistication of terrorists has contributed to an ongoing electronic struggle for
data access and security (Scheiner, 2013). Nevertheless, the NSA has access to a
huge amount of data, especially through the communication trunks that move Internet
data. If it cannot get access through agreements with telecommunication companies, it
has been suggested (Snowden) that the NSA surreptitiously monitors communication
channels by tapping undersea cables, intercepting satellite communications, and other
data sources. Through its ability to quickly sift large amounts of meta-data, it can
identify the sources of communications, its content, and the individuals involved.
Open source intelligence activities, like monitoring magazines, newspapers, radio
and television broadcasts, are another important tool to track terrorists. Many terrorist
organizations provide valuable information about themselves in their public
communications and propaganda campaigns (Prunckun, 2015). Al Qaeda’s broadcasts
and publications have provided significant information on the goals and objectives of the
group. While also mobilizing and communicating with actual and potential terrorists, the
digital crumbs associated with the dissemination of magazines, such as INSPIRE and Al
SHAMIKA, provide access to the potential identity and location of those who appear to
at least be interested in their cause (Bates and Mooney, 2014).
The Internet has become a crucial tool for global terrorism (Matusitz, 2015). Their
web sites number over 7,000, and terrorists have been successful in hacking other sites
to post propaganda videos. In a process called steganography, they also embed
messages within text or videos (Lau, 2003). Nevertheless, the NSA and other federal
agencies have developed effective counter measures to thwart electronic encryption
and covert communications channels (Branch, Armitage and Branch, 2007).
The Dark Web also has become a source of terrorist activity. Using the onion.link
router and software such as TOR, terrorists raise funds via bitcoin and put up mirrored
sites to support sites regularly deleted on the World-Wide Web. As Cox (2015) noted,
terrorists have used the Dark Web to post propaganda videos like the documentary,
The Flames of War, and to rally jihadists in the Balkan countries. However, as verified
in the Snowden leaks, the NSA is using a program known as XKeyscore, which
automatically identifies anyone attempting to download TOR. Though this program
identifies individuals using TOR, it does not capture what they are accessing on the
Dark Web. Former Department of Homeland Security Directors Michael Chertoff and
Toby Smith (2015) believe that law enforcement and other security agencies should
monitor TOR users and sites. In particular, they recommend mapping the hidden
service directory, customer data monitoring, social site monitoring, hidden service
monitoring and marketplace profiling.
Terrorist activities on the Dark Web and the Visible Web are not only monitored by
governmental security agencies, but they are also viewed by private citizens concerned
about terrorism and potential hate crimes. Groups of researchers, hackers, and
maverick computer geeks, who cyber-stalk terrorist networks, are now active in both the
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United States and abroad. Aaron Weisburd, founder of Internet Haganah and director
of the Society for Internet Research, works out of his Carbondale, Illinois home and
describes his organization as a "global non-governmental ad-hoc intelligence network"
modeled after al Qaeda's very own network. His organization has assisted in shutting
down numerous sites linked to networks affiliated with groups such as Hezbollah,
Hamas, al Qaeda and ISIS (Rosenblatt, 2007).
Terrorist groups like the Islamic Cyber Caliphate Army have responded by
developing hackers who have attacked government, commercial, and private web sites.
They have hacked sites, uploaded propaganda, and released personal and confidential
information about military, police and government officials. With posts on both the
Visible and Dark webs, these cyber terrorists have encouraged lone wolf attacks on
identified individuals and their families (SIG, 2016). Recently, they also targeted a
number of world leaders and even Weisburd and his group.
The struggle between terrorists and counterterrorism agencies also takes place
within the environment of social media. Terrorists, and in particular lone wolf terrorists,
often seek affirmation or opportunities to promote their radical perspectives through
social media sites. Carmon and Stalinsky (2015) suggest that American companies like
Twitter, FaceBook, Google, Apple, Microsoft, YouTube, WhatApp, Skype, Tumblr and
Instagram have served as propaganda vehicles for global jihadists. Through graphic
beheadings and other executions, ISIS has gained attention and recognition as the new
leader in global jihad. The power of social media, as reflected in the Arab Spring, has
been a significant force multiplier in the world of terrorism. Not only groups of terrorists,
but also single actors are mobilized, directed or at least inspired through the constant
flow of posts, tweets and other forms of social media.
Just as advertisers and marketing specialists have learned to monitor and mine
social media for commercial purposes, so too have security agencies. Using false
identities, called “sock puppets,” social media can be used to identify, track and
manipulate participants (Prunckun, 2015). Online fake agents, employing sophisticated
computer-generated algorithms based on narrative and statistical probabilities,
penetrate radical forums and disseminate false information.
Along with profiling, forensic accounting, communication monitoring, and Internet
and social media scrutiny, terrorist tracking also involves other covert techniques. At
the international level, satellites and drones identify and track groups and individual
terrorists and locate training camps and related infrastructure. Recently, the U.S.
military and special operation entities have begun using miniature satellites known as
Cubesats to track specific terrorist targets (Klotz, 2014). Even private citizens have
contributed to tracking activities through Google Earth technology (Noak, 2014). The
military also has been using drone technology to track and interdict terrorists in current
combat zones. Likewise, drones are now being used for border security in the U.S. and
for immigration and homeland security purposes (Gunderson, 2015).
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Human intelligence (HUMINT) also continues to play a vital role in the identification
and tracking of terrorists. Clandestine and covert operatives provide vital and specific
information on terrorist activities. The use of informants and agents to gather
information is, however, a high risk activity. Therefore, specifics on this form of terrorist
tracking will not be presented. However, community-based surveillance programs, such
as Community Oriented Policing (COP) like the Green Bay Way, illustrate the many
benefits of embedded neighborhood policing. COP often encourages information on
criminal and possible terrorist radicalization. The similar strategy of Mosaic
Engagement, found in the United Kingdom’s Preventing Violent Extremism Strategy
(Prevent), is another example of engaging local communities to identify radicalization
and terrorism (Southers, 2013).
Tracking Lone Wolf Terrorists
While identifying potential lone wolf terrorists is difficult, tracking them is even more
so. Part of that difficulty is that they may be associated with a variety of causes and
groups. Today, the threat of inspired or directed radical Islamic jihadist terrorism
dominates the news. The major attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice, Ft. Hood, San
Bernardino, Orlando and other sites, both foreign and domestic, have focused our
attention on this group. However, numerous other domestic terror threats have been
associated with a variety of other groups. The FBI has tracked white supremacist
groups like the KKK, Aryan Nation and related hate groups. Single-issue groups like
the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and anti-abortion groups
also have spawned lone wolf terrorist attacks. The Southern Poverty Law Center tracks
148 “patriot groups” which include anti-tax and anti-government organizations, various
militia groups, and the Sovereign Citizens, all of which have been associated with
violence and lone wolf attacks (Somashekhar and Leonnig, 2015). However, law
enforcement and the Department of Homeland Security face practical, legal and political
challenges when investigating and tracking these domestic groups.
The increasing threats from radical Islamic terrorist groups and their advocates have
gained national attention. As Bergen (2016) notes, self-radicalized lone wolf attackers
in the U.S. are a greater threat than returning ISIS fighters from Syria and Iraq, but
finding them remains difficult since they do not fit any ethnic profile and the only thing in
common is their connection to social media. On the other hand, Weiman (2015)
suggests that the lone wolf label may be a detriment to addressing this problem. The
belief that terrorists of this type act alone is incorrect; they are inspired or directed by
others. Wolves do not hunt alone; they hunt in packs. In this instance, a virtual wolf
pack inspires or directs these acts. Lone wolves are often recruited, trained and directed
by others online. They use the Internet to find everything from instructions on how to
make a bomb, diagrams of public buildings, and names of police, government and
military to target. YouTube videos and Twitter postings provide inspiration, direction
and personal contacts with other jihadists and also fighters in Iraq and Syria. In 2015,
the Brookings Institute identified over 46,000 Twitter accounts used by ISIS activists
(Millar, 2015).
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In their study of 119 lone actor terrorists, Gill, Horgan and Deckart (2014) found that
they regularly engaged in detectable and observable activities with a wide range of
individuals, social movements, or terrorist organizations. Using the Internet, YouTube,
Twitter or similar forms of social media, these individuals have posted manifestos,
diatribes or pleas calling for violence, and, in their minds, justifiable acts against others.
Thus, one of the first steps to identify and track potential lone wolf terrorists is to monitor
these sites.
Whereas al Qaeda is an elitist radical Islamic terror group, ISIS is a populist group
and uses the Internet to open its ranks to almost anyone willing to further their goals.
Their form of lone wolf terrorism encourages ex-post-facto declarations of identification
with the movement. This provides greater security and anonymity for self-radicalized
jihadists and minimizes their prior identification and tracking. However, even the most
independent attacks involve some prior public or virtual commitment. For this reason,
friends, relatives and the public are critical in countering terrorists, in the same way as
law enforcement deals with single-shooters.
Gill, Horgan and Deckart (2014) also found that lone-actor terrorist events were
rarely sudden and impulsive. Evidence of some form of virtual or hands-on training as
well as strategic or tactical planning was associated with most attacks. This planning
and acquisition of skills, weapons and/or other related resources provide for the
discovery of lone wolf terrorists. Obviously, travel to a terrorist training facility, either
domestic or abroad, is a trackable activity. The acquisition of weapons or bomb-making
supplies provides additional evidence of an impending terrorist action. The Boston
Marathon bombers accessed INSPIRE magazine to make a pressure cooker-based
explosive device. They also purchased fireworks for the black powder to build the
bombs (Weiman, 2015). Timothy McVeigh followed the Anarchist’s Cook Book’s recipe
to make the fertilizer fuel oil-based explosive (ANFO) used in the Oklahoma City
bombing (Fire, 1995). Because of their potential danger, people purchasing quantities
must provide personal documentation. However, the attacks in Paris and Brussels
involved the explosive TATP (triacetone-triperoxide), also called the “Mother of Satan”
because of its instability, which is available in nail polish remover and hydrogen
peroxide found in most homes. Nevertheless, geospatial analysis of these precursors
may prove useful to track potential terrorists (Smith, et. al., 2005).
As previously noted, it is difficult to profile lone wolf terrorists. However, despite their
diversity, researchers have noted distinguishable differences between subgroups.
Compared to right wing and single-issue lone wolves, those inspired by radical Islamic
groups (al Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram) are generally younger, are often students and are
likely to have sought legitimation from epistemic authority figures. They are more likely
to have been radicalized and trained through virtual sources. Right wing lone wolves,
on the other hand, are usually unemployed, less educated, have made verbal
statements to friends and families about their intent or beliefs, and have engaged in dry
runs or have obtained assistance from others in procuring weapons (Gill, Horgan and
Deckart, 2014).
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Created by Congress in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security’s mission
includes preventing terrorism and enhancing security; managing our borders;
administering immigration laws; securing cyberspace; and ensuring disaster resilience
(DHS, 2016). The DHS is committed to operating a multifaceted team of 22 government
agencies and organizations to stop terrorism before it occurs. These agencies include
the Secret Service, the Border Patrol, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the
Coast Guard and other agencies responsible for transportation security and port
security, plus a number of intelligence organizations. Because of its size, the
complexity of the agencies involved, and the diversity of some of their missions,
coordination and cooperation have been problematic (White, 2014).
The FBI allocates billions of dollars to support counterterrorism efforts (Strickland,
2014). The National Counterterrorism Center (NCC) coordinates these efforts, including
the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) of over 4,000 members nationwide from 500
state and local agencies and 55 federal agencies. The JTTF provides a one-stop
source for information, including the terror watch list, which enables a shared
intelligence base across many agencies. However, because lone wolf terrorism in the
U.S. is a national issue, many of the government agencies such as the NSA and CIA
are restricted from operating domestically. Though the Patriot Act has expanded the
powers of our domestic intelligence agencies like the FBI, the clash over civil liberties
has limited the tools and tactics of counterterrorism within the U.S.
As a domestic issue, lone wolf terrorism is a major responsibility of state and local
law enforcement agencies. Using JTTF information and undercover or cyber operations
by the FBI, local agencies investigate, track and respond to domestic threats. A variety
of law enforcement agencies like the Law Enforcement Information Network, the
National Crime Information Center, and the fusion centers around the country provide
important information to local law enforcement (White, 2014). Thus far, state and local
law enforcement has been reasonably successful – with the help of the above agencies.
However, the anonymity and mobility of potential lone wolf terrorists still poses a
significant challenge.
A Potential Response
Enhanced communication and intelligence sharing is necessary between external
and internal homeland security agencies and state and local law enforcement. Since
lone wolf terrorism is, for the most part, an internal security threat at the community
level, local law enforcement must identify, track, and interdict them. To do this, they
must move beyond their traditional roles and include more attention, training and
intelligence gathering to counterterrorism.
Through federal grants, many local agencies have upgraded their tools and tactics to
deal with terrorist threats, but most are focused on response. SWAT team training,
increased firepower and special assault-style vehicles will help, but it takes enhanced
intelligence and investigative capabilities to deter local terrorist activities. For example,
720 municipal law enforcement agencies that integrate community policing with the new
10

mandates from the DHS have increased their counterterrorism preparedness – and
have also lowered their local crime rates (Adcox, 2014).
Local agencies can access federal counterterrorism information. The terror watch list
is available, including the FBI Terrorist Screening Center’s password-protected App
(application) via a smart phone. The Digital Terror + Hate App from the Simon
Weisenthahl Center lists information on jihadists, white supremacists, anti-Semitic and
other hate groups. While the federal government has extensive resources to track
terrorists, most local agencies may have one or two individuals, at best, who deal with
digital surveillance. These Apps can help. The website addresses and social media
accounts of locals who run solo hate campaigns provide a geographic search function
to identify the sources and support networks of lone wolf terrorists (Koebler, 2015).
Local communities can prioritize the types of terrorist threats because of increased
access to relevant terrorist-related intelligence. Given a community’s demographics, the
patterns of social media content observed, and the types of groups or individuals
identified by federal or regional agencies, police can improve their focus on potential
threats. Some communities are more likely to be a source of jihadist radicalization, yet
others may have a higher risk of anti-government or white supremacist activities. Police
auxiliary officers, with adequate cyber training, can provide intelligence information
pertinent to local threats just as Weisburd ‘s Society for Internet Research (Greenberg
and Cooper, 1996).
Most lone wolf terrorists engage in some prior acts. Frequenting known hate groups
or mosques with extremist reputations may be an additional part of the mosaic of
radicalization. Local police could make routine checks to find buyers of large amounts of
fertilizer or similar components for improvised explosives, with special attention to locals
on the terror watch list. They could also monitor local concealed carry permit
applications, especially for those who were turned down. Local gun shows could be
monitored for those purchasing weapons from private sellers, which bypasses the
federal firearms background check requirement (Bates, 2015). Local law enforcement
could work with area gun stores to identify individuals who did not pass the required
background check or who appear suspicious (Cutway, 2016).
Enhanced community engagement activities by local police also can provide a more
conducive environment for counterterrorism awareness. If local police have sufficient
diversity in their staff, they may be better able to make and maintain contacts in the
community. If little diversity is present, local police may seek community support to
create outreach opportunities. A ministerial alliance, including leaders of local mosques
or similar religious groups, can improve community solidarity. It also might identify
those groups that avoid interaction or cooperation with others.
Tracking lone wolf terrorists in a local community is difficult. Limited resources and
legal restraints are significant impediments. A balance must be maintained to avoid the
alienation of individuals. However, improved coordination between federal and local
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agencies, combined with the use of open-source data and increased community
engagement can foster the identification and tracking of potential lone wolf threats.
Conclusions
As the threat of domestic and international terrorism increases, the identification and
tracking of terrorists is the most important component of counterterrorism. Given the
diversity of the sources of terrorism, each threat is associated with different structural
environments and potential participants. Profiling terrorists is very difficult. However,
focusing on the routes to terrorism has allowed us to better understand the recruitment,
radicalization, and related activities associated with terrorism in general and lone wolf
terrorism in particular. Digital crumbs left as they become radicalized and move from
spectator to potential threat provide clues for their identification. At the international and
national levels, forensic accounting, the monitoring of the Internet and the Dark Web,
and the use of undercover cyber operatives play important roles in effective
counterterrorism. Local law enforcement can use the information developed by other
agencies and can provide community awareness and local engagement to address the
threat of lone wolf terrorists. The most important element remains the vigilance and
involvement of citizens and even family members. While lone wolf terrorists are hard to
identify and track, learning more about their routes and behaviors gives us the tools and
tactics for more effective counterterrorism.
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